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18 U.S.C. § 1030(g): A Guide to Obtaining
Jurisdiction in the United States for a Civil
Suit Against a Foreign National Defendant
Michael C. McCutcheon
I. INTRODUCTION
There are very few people who would venture to say the
proliferation of computers and the Internet into the world economic
system has been anything but beneficial to the planet, both socially
and economically. Communications over the Internet allow unpar-
alleled opportunities for education, research, commerce and enter-
tainment.1 However, there are a few individuals who no longer see
the Internet and its opportunities through rose-colored spectacles.
They are the unfortunate, but steadily growing, number of indi-
viduals who have fallen victim to what is being called the signature
crime of the digital era; identity theft.' Identity theft is the illegal
use of another's personal identification numbers. For example, one
might use a stolen driver's license, credit card, or social security
number to purchase goods, apply for loans, or rent an apartment
for themselves. While this sort of crime has been perpetuated by
criminals for as long as there have been identifying documents in
existence, the Internet is making easier and more lucrative to com-
mit this crime.
As the Internet's potential to serve as a powerful medium for
international commerce expands, so too does its attractiveness as a
tool for those who wish to commit illegal acts. 3 Indeed, the Internet
has enhanced criminals' abilities to commit traditional crimes more
efficiently and anonymously. It has also created new opportunities
for crime.4 Specifically, identity thieves are no longer hampered by
the existence of national or international boundaries. Nor are they
limited to perpetuating their crime by stealing physical embodi-
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ments of the information they require, such as credit card receipts,
drivers licenses, and check books. On the Internet, there are no
faces and no signatures. There is literally nothing that prevents one
individual from posing as another on the Internet except security
codes and passwords, which are often intercepted or cracked. Just
as telephones were used by traditional boiler-room operators to
defraud victims from a distance, a computer server running a web
page designed to defraud consumers might be located in Thailand
and victims of the scam could be scattered throughout numerous
different countries.5
The federal government and many state governments have
passed new legislation to address the problem of identity theft and
computer related crime. In some cases the government has created
entirely new statutes to cope with the problem. In others it has
merely increased the penalties or added amendments to existing
legislation to deal with these newer, more sophisticated versions of
fraud. One example that has gained much attention is the federal
Identity Theft and Assumption Deterrence Act of 1998 which makes
it a crime to knowingly possess with the intent to use or unlawfully
transfer a means of identification of another person.6 While this
statute, and other similar state versions, are steps in the right direc-
tion for law enforcement, there are still very few instances of suc-
cessful prosecution and even fewer instances of redress for the
individual victims who are often left with enormous unearned
debt, ruined credit ratings, and in some cases unwarranted criminal
records. 7
The damage done to identity theft and computer fraud
victims is measured not only in terms of dollars, but also in pain,
embarrassment, and frustration. The remedy provided by the
criminal statutes like the Identity Theft and Assumption Deterrence
Act is often inadequate for two reasons. First, it is not an extraterri-
torial statute. Its specific language does not allow for its use against
a foreign criminal in United States courts. Due to the international
nature of the Internet and the ever increasing number of personal
computers in the world, it should come as no surprise that crimes
like identity theft, financial institution fraud, and other computer
related crimes are being committed worldwide. For example, an
American purchasing a patio set with his credit card over the
Internet from his personal computer in Chicago can become a
victim of fraud almost instantly when his personal information is
Loyola Consumer Law ReviewVolume 13, Number 1 2001
intercepted and used without permission by a French national in
Berlin, Germany. Second, and perhaps more importantly for the
victim, the Act does not provide a private right of action for the
victim to maintain a civil action for compensatory damages and
injunctive relief against the perpetrator. Civil relief may be just
what a victim will want and, due to the difficulty law enforcement
agencies have in prosecuting digital identity thieves, it may be the
only kind a victim can possibly get.
Usually, suing a criminal for compensatory damages is
considered a futile act because most criminals are judgment proof.
In most cases of identity theft this will probably be true as well.
However, there are reasons for pursuing a civil lawsuit in identity
theft cases that do not exist in most other criminal cases. First, most
identity thieves will use a person's identity to purchase goods that
may still be available if a victim can obtain a judgment. Second,
many victims are faced with having to explain to their creditors, the
creditors of their illegal-twin and possibly law enforcement officials
what has happened and why. This is one of the most difficult things
for victims to deal with since many creditors and police are unwill-
ing to believe them at their word. Maintaining a civil suit and
eventually obtaining a judgment against the defendant may make
the job of cleaning up the mess left behind much easier. Finally,
there is the psychological benefit that comes from doing something
pro-active about an individual's status as a victim. Many identity
theft victims complain of feeling overwhelmed and helpless to do
anything about their situation. As with victims of other crimes,
these individuals feel angry, confused, guilty and often ashamed
about what has happened. Turning to the police for help is the first
step, but being able to file and maintain a lawsuit through judg-
ment may be the best possible redress for the victim emotionally.
This article will address one avenue, of the few available,
that an identity theft victim may take in pursuit of a civil remedy
against his offender.8 Specifically, this article will address the juris-
dictional issues that arise when an American citizen attempts to sue
a foreign national in a U.S. court claiming damages resulting from
fraud under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act as amended by
National Information Infrastructure Protection Act of 1996, 18
U.S.C. § 1030(g) ("section 1030"), which provides a civil remedy for
plaintiffs injured as result of computer related crime.
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II. THE AMENDED COMPUTER FRAUD AND ABUSE ACT: 18 U.S.C. § 1030
The Counterfeit Access Device and Computer Fraud and
Abuse Act of 1984 was intentionally narrowly tailored to protect
classified United States defense and foreign relations information,
financial institution and consumer reporting agency files, and
access to computers operated for the government.9 Section 1030
was originally adopted by Congress in 1984 for the purpose of
protecting government computer networks and databases from
criminals, rogue foreign states and computer hackers. However, as
the use of computers in the private sector grew so did the scope of
section 1030.10 Originally, section 1030 only protected from crime
those computers, and their owners, which were located in more
than one state." In 1996, the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 18
U.S.C. § 1030, was amended by the National Information Infra-
structure Act to extend protection to all computers used in inter-
state and foreign commerce or communication.2 Therefore, section
1030 now protects the user of each and every computer in America
that is connected to the Internet. 3 What once was an Act centered
on national defense is now a consumer protection device that is
available to virtually anyone who surfs the net.
Subsection (a)(4) of section 1030 is most applicable to victims
of identity theft. It states, "whoever knowingly and with intent to
defraud, accesses a protected computer without authorization...and
by means of such conduct furthers the intended fraud and obtains
anything of value..." has committed a federal offense. 4 Under this
subsection, anyone who obtains identification information by either
tapping into an individual's home computer or the computer sys-
tem of a web-based retailer or service provider for the purpose of
conducting fraudulent transactions can be prosecuted under section
1030. Violation of section 1030(a)(4) can result in a fine or imprison-
ment for up to five years, or both.' 5 A repeat offense can result in a
ten year jail sentence. 16
More important for the purposes of this article is subsection
(g), which provides that "[any person who suffers damage or loss
by reason of violation of this section may maintain a civil action
against the violator to obtain compensatory damages and injunc-
tive relief..." 7 The damages must be in excess of $5000 over the
course of one year. 8 In addition, section 1030 also contains a two
year statute of limitations. 19 Subsection (g) makes the Act a more
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effective tool than most statutes designed to curb the spread of
identity theft for two reasons. First, subsection (g) encourages the
reporting of identity theft and other computer related crimes,
which leads to more efficient law enforcement. Second, it puts the
victim in control of his affairs and it allows an individual who often
feels helpless to actively pursue a private remedy for his injury.2"
Although on its face section 1030 is a powerful tool for
combating computer related crime such as identity theft, to date
there are very few published opinions that have discussed the
statute. This is surprising considering the wide applicability the
few courts that have ruled on section 1030 have given it.21 Unfortu-
nately, there are even fewer opinions which have discussed subsec-
tion (g) as it applies to domestic defendants and there are currently
no opinions that have discussed its application to foreign national
defendants. Consequently, much hypothesis and many assump-
tions must be made in analyzing this statute's potential application.
However, it is hoped that through taking these measures, section
1030(g) will emerge as a viable and practical federal cause of action.
The first step in filing a suit against a perpetrator of identity
theft is locating him and discovering his true identity 2 If the
offender is a resident of the victim's state or a citizen of the United
States, obtaining the proper jurisdiction will not ordinarily be
exceedingly difficult to file and maintain a lawsuit against him.
Generally speaking, even though it may be inconvenient to estab-
lish jurisdiction in the plaintiff's home forum over a domestic
defendant, there is substantial case law at every judicial level to
turn to for guidance. However, when the defendant is a foreign
national who has possibly never left his home country, the question
of how to properly obtain jurisdiction for a lawsuit can become
complicated, or at least it appears that way.23
Since section 1030 is a federal statute, a plaintiff could choose
to sue in either state or federal court. A plaintiff may want to sue in
state court for a number of reasons ranging from better familiarity
with the state court system to pure convenience. However, for the
purposes of this article we will assume the plaintiff will file in
federal court, which then makes it necessary to discuss subject
matter jurisdiction, an issue which is intertwined with the substan-
tive law that will apply to a foreign national who has been haled
into United States court (legislative jurisdiction is discussed in
Section V, infra). In addition, federal courts are generally considered
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to be better versed in the law pertaining to foreign defendants, and
are generally more familiar with deciding constitutional law issues.
Furthermore, there is a preference in American jurisprudence, albeit
a fading one, to settle international disputes in federal rather than
state courts. 4
III. SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION: FEDERAL QUESTION JURISDICTION
AND ALIENAGE
There are two options for claiming that subject matter juris-
diction is available to the practitioner who wants to file a federal
lawsuit against a foreign individual under sectionl030(g). Before
discussing these options in detail, it will be helpful to set up a quick
hypothetical scenario from which to conduct the analysis.
The plaintiff in this fictional case is named Dave and he is a
graduate student in business at the University of Lemont in Illinois.
In early August of 1999, Dave conducted a credit check on himself
and realized that over the last six months someone had incurred
close to $80,000 in debt in his name. Shocked, Dave looked into the
matter further and discovered that over a dozen credit card ac-
counts had been fraudulently opened in his name and had subse-
quently been used to purchase thousands of dollars of sophisticated
computer equipment from on-line computer sellers. Dave, being a
resourceful graduate student, acquired the records of these sales
from the on-line retailers and noticed that all of the addresses for
the delivery of the equipment were in Germany. After further
investigation, Dave tracked down the perpetrator, a 55 year-old
German citizen named Dieter.
Thinking back, Dave remembered that in January of 1999 he
had used the Internet from his home to purchase some rare
"techno-dance" records from a music distributor located in En-
gland. Dave used his credit card to purchase these records and also
gave his home address, e-mail address, social security number, and
other identification information to the music store to keep him
abreast of the latest in "techno-dance" music. Dave contacted the
United States Secret Service25 which conducted an investigation of
the crime. After a few months the Secret Service concluded that
Dieter intercepted Dave's on-line business transaction, and stole his
credit card number, address and social security number. Dieter
subsequently tapped into his e-mail account to find the rest of the
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necessary information he needed to use Dave's identity and credit
history to purchase computer equipment.
Dave is very upset, and he has significant economic and
legal troubles as a result of Dieter's actions. The Secret Service says
it will prosecute Dieter to the full extent that section 1030 provides,
but that does little to help Dave's piece of mind or his pocket book.
Dave wants to sue Dieter for damages exceeding $100,000 in the
federal district court under 18 U.S.C. § 1030(g).
The first thing that Dave's attorney must decide is whether
or not the federal court has subject matter jurisdiction over his case.
In contrast to state courts which have virtually unlimited subject
matter jurisdiction, the federal judiciary was created with limited
subject matter jurisdiction. 26 A federal court cannot exercise juris-
diction over a case unless both the Constitution and a valid federal
statute grant such jurisdiction.27 There are five general federal
statutory grants of subject matter jurisdiction within the limits of
Article III of the United States Constitution that are applicable to
international disputes, however only federal question and alienage
jurisdictional grants will apply in a situation like this.28
A. Federal Question Jurisdiction: 28 U.S.C. § 1331
Federal question jurisdiction is derived from Article III of the
United States Constitution and is the most significant of the federal
grants of subject matter jurisdiction. 29 Article III creates jurisdiction
over "cases ...arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United
States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their
authority."30 This grant of federal jurisdiction has been codified in
28 U.S.C. § 1331, which repeats the language quoted above, in order
to confer original jurisdiction on the lower federal courts.31 Most of
section 1331's actions are brought into federal court via a specific
federal substantive statute that creates a federal cause of action.32
Whether or not a cause of action arises under section 1331 is deter-
mined by using the "well-pleaded complaint" analysis. The "well-
pleaded complaint" analysis requires the court to examine the
plaintiff's complaint to determine if it asserts a claim created by
federal law rather than merely predicting a federally based defense
by the defendant.33
In this case, Dave must plead the civil cause of action that is
specifically created by federal statute 18 U.S.C. § 1030(g).'M The
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court must then decide whether Dieter committed computer fraud
against Dave, causing damages in excess of $5000 as it is defined in
section 1030. A claim based on section 1030 "arises under" federal
law because section 1030 is a "Law of the United States." Thus, it is
a claim within the meaning of section 1331 and the court will have
subject matter jurisdiction to hear it. Having federal question juris-
diction is enough for the court to decide the case. In this particular
situation however, the court will also have alienage jurisdiction
over the defendant. In practice, if a plaintiff chooses not to sue
under section 1030(g) or any other available federal statute, but
instead sues a foreign defendant under a common law theory,
alienage jurisdiction will also allow the case to be heard in federal
court.
B. Alienage Jurisdiction: 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(2)
Article III of the United States Constitution also grants
alienage jurisdiction to the federal courts.35 Thus, the federal courts
have subject matter jurisdiction over cases and controversies "be-
tween a State, or the Citizens thereof, and Foreign States, Citizens
or Subjects." 36 The reasoning behind this grant of jurisdiction lies
in the Founders' belief that disputes involving foreigners were
likely to concern issues of national importance which federal courts
were considered best able to decide.37 However, the Supreme Court
has narrowed the interpretation of alienage jurisdiction to include
only suits between United States citizens and an alien, and not suits
between two aliens.38
Alienage jurisdiction has been codified in 28 U.S.C. §
1332(a)(2), which provides federal district courts with original
jurisdiction over civil actions in which more than $75,000 is at stake
and the controversy is between "citizens of a State and citizens or
subjects of a foreign state." Thus, in a situation like Dave's, where
he is seeking to sue one individual who is an exclusive citizen of
Germany, section 1332(a)(2) grants the necessary subject matter
jurisdiction, assuming Dave is suing for more than the $75,000
minimum.
In reality, there may be cases of international computer fraud
that arise under section 1030 that affect several people, all of whom
may want to be parties to any ensuing civil litigation. In cases like
this, it is necessary to closely examine who the plaintiffs and defen-
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dants will be, as well as the law of the particular district court the
case is being filed in.
Under section 1332(a)(3), the district courts have jurisdiction
over cases between citizens of different states where foreign nation-
als are additional parties.39 Thus, if in Dave's case it turned out that
Tony, a citizen of New York, had aided Dieter in the commission of
his crime the federal court would have jurisdiction to hear the case
of Dave(Illinois) v. Tony(New York) and Dieter(Germany). Further-
more, some United States courts have ruled that section 1332(a)(3)
also applies to cases where a United States citizen and a foreign
national are suing a diverse United States citizen and another
foreign national." For example, if Dave(Illinois) and the music
store owner Ian(Britain) decided to sue Tony(New York) and
Dieter(Germany), some federal courts see this minimally diverse
case as falling within the bounds of section 1332(a)(3) and will
agree to hear it.41 However, if Tony was an Illinois citizen instead of
a New York citizen, section 1332(a)(3) would not provide jurisdic-
tion because the U.S. litigants are not diverse. 42 While these varia-
tions are subject to differing judicial opinion, the original Dave
hypothetical is unanimously considered to be within the original
alienage jurisdiction of the United States.
IV. OBTAINING PERSONAL JURISDICTION OVER A FOREIGN NATIONAL
DEFENDANT
A United States court cannot adjudicate cases and render
binding decisions on the parties unless it also has "personal juris-
diction" over the defendant.43 There are two requirements that
must both be met before a court will have personal jurisdiction over
a party. First, there must be a specific statutory grant of jurisdiction
to the forum's courts.44 Second, that statutory grant must be con-
sistent with the Due Process Clause of the Constitution.45 Further, it
is important to note that personal jurisdiction over foreign defen-
dants is decided under the same long-arm and constitutional
"minimum contacts" analysis as domestic defendants.'
State and federal courts have distinct approaches to personal
jurisdiction analysis. All of the states in the union have created
"long-arm" personal jurisdiction statutes that are either specific as
to when and how a court can assert jurisdiction,47 or phrased gener-
ally by granting jurisdiction "consistent with the requirements of
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Due Process." 4' In either case, the state's assertion of jurisdiction
must comply with Due Process in order to be deemed constitu-
tional. State long-arm statutes are usually used to obtain jurisdic-
tion over parties located in different states, but they are equally
applicable to parties who are foreign nationals.49
Unlike the state courts, federal courts do not have general
jurisdictional long-arm statutes.5° Instead, the federal courts use
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4 ("Rule 4") to determine whether
they have personal jurisdiction in both domestic and international
disputes. Rule 4 provides the federal courts with five ways to assert
personal jurisdiction, three of which are discussed later in Section A.5
In addition to Rule 4, the federal court may also look to the
Restatement (Third) Foreign Relations Law § 421, which explains
the limitations that contemporary international law imposes upon
courts in determining whether or not to exercise personal jurisdic-
tion.52 Although the Restatement (Third) is not binding authority
on the federal courts, many courts will take into consideration
Restatement(Third) § 421 because of the belief that Congress never
intends to legislate rules of procedure that purposefully conflict
with principles of international law.
Section A of this article will discuss three pertinent grants of
jurisdiction that Federal Rule 4 provides in the context of Dave's
case. Specifically, Section A will address the issues of general versus
specific jurisdiction, minimum contacts analysis, purposeful
availment analysis, and the effects doctrine. Next, Section B will
examine decisions regarding personal jurisdiction over defendants
in Internet cases. Finally, Section C will briefly discuss
Restatement(Third) § 421 and its application to the hypothetical.
While the majority of the decisions discussed in Section B do not
involve international defendants, the courts use virtually the same
analysis whether the defendants are from different states or from
different countries than that in which the court presides.53
A. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(k): Statutory Grants of
Personal Jurisdiction in Federal Court
Federal Rule 4, revised in 1993, provides for personal juris-
diction in three distinct ways.' First, Rule 4 allows federal courts to
borrow the long-arm statute of the state which embraces the court
regardless of whether the case is based on diversity, alienage, or
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federal question." Second, Rule 4 gives federal courts the power to
exercise specific grants of jurisdiction conferred on the courts by an
applicable federal statute.56 Third, Rule 4(k) permits federal courts
to assert jurisdiction in cases involving a federal question to the
extent that it is consistent with the Constitution, where the defen-
dant is not subject to the jurisdiction of the federal courts of any
particular state.57
All three of these are possibilities for asserting jurisdiction in
a situation like Dave's where an non-corporate individual is sued
under a federal statute. The likelihood of the federal courts assert-
ing jurisdiction over a foreign defendant under any one of these
options depends on the particular federal district in which the
plaintiff files his suit. This is due to the fact that the district court
will use the law of the state in which it is located for long-arm
purposes, and different courts may analyze the second and third
options differently. In this article, because Dave is an Illinois resi-
dent, we will examine the Illinois' long-arm statute. As for the
second and third options, an examination of the relevant court
decisions from across the nation will yield a better understanding
of the requirements a court will have to meet in order to assert
personal jurisdiction.
1. Using Illinois' long-arm statute to obtain personal jurisdiction
over a defendant in federal court
Under most state long-arm statutes, a court may exercise
general jurisdiction over a nonresident when the defendant is
physically present in the forum.8 In addition, general jurisdiction is
permissible when a nonresident defendant conducts routine, con-
tinuous, or systematic business in the forum.59 When general
jurisdiction is appropriate, the nonresident may be sued on any
cause of action that arises anywhere in the world, even if the
defendant's presence in the forum is unrelated to the cause of
action.6 °
Furthermore, most long arm statutes permit specific jurisdic-
tion over a nonresident defendant for causes of action that arise out
of the nonresident's forum-related activity.6 Generally, long-arm
statutes confer specific jurisdiction over nonresidents who: (1)
transact business in the forum; (2) commit tortious acts in the fo-
rum; or (3) commit a tortious act outside the forum resulting in
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injury within the forum. Specific jurisdiction is crucial in a situation
where a defendant, like Dieter, does not conduct routine, continu-
ous, or systematic business in the forum state.
Illinois Compiled Statutes 735 ILCS 5/2-209 provides Illi-
nois' requirements for exercising long-arm jurisdiction.6 2 Subsec-
tion (a) contains examples of jurisdictional submissions by the
defendant to Illinois' state courts and the federal district courts of
Illinois vis-a-vis Federal Rule 4(A)(1). 63 In addition, subsection (b)
describes four situations in which a court located in Illinois may
actively assert jurisdiction over an individual.' However, this
section will not apply where the defendant is a non-corporate
individual who is not a resident of Illinois or present when served
with process. Finally, subsection (c) allows the court to exercise
jurisdiction on any basis allowed under the Illinois Constitution
and the United States Constitution.5 Thus, under subsection (c), if
the contacts between the defendant and Illinois are sufficient to
satisfy the Due Process requirements, then the requirements of both
the Illinois long-arm statute and the United States Constitution
have been met, and no other analysis is necessary.66
Nonetheless, finding a "hook" for jurisdiction in Illinois
under subsection (a) is the preferable avenue to pursue because,
even though the court must still consider the Due Process require-
ments of the United States Constitution and section 2-209(c), there
may be considerable case law available to back a claim of jurisdic-
tion under one of these exceptions. Under subsection (a)(2), a court
will consider a defendant like Dieter to have submitted to the
jurisdiction of Illinois by committing the tortious act of fraud if it
finds that the act of electronically entering Dave's home computer
to steal information was an act committed "within the state" under
Illinois law. Since the act of electronically entering a computer
located within the state to further a fraud is an issue that has not
yet been specifically litigated in Illinois, there currently is no defini-
tive answer to this question in existing Illinois case law regarding
section 2-209(a)(2). However, examining existing decisions in Illi-
nois containing similar facts and circumstances may allow us to
accurately predict what the courts would consider in deciding an
issue like this.
In FMC Corp. v. Varonos, the Seventh Circuit held that the
defendant's act of sending communications in the form of telexes
and telecopies from Greece that contained misrepresentations
Loyola Consumer Law ReviewVolume 13, Number 1 2001
designed to defraud the plaintiff in Illinois were tortious acts com-
mitted in Illinois.67 The court relied on Club Assistance Program, Inc.
v. Zuckerman, where the California defendants were subjected to
personal jurisdiction in Illinois as a result of their sending mail and
placing telephone calls to Illinois to further a scheme of fraud." The
FMC Corp. court ruled that it saw no reason to distinguish commu-
nications to Illinois made through the mail or by telephone from
communications made via telex or telecopier.69 Further, the court
addressed the Due Process requirements and held that the defen-
dant should have foreseen that her communications, which were
intended to defraud an Illinois resident, would require her to an-
swer for her actions in Illinois.
More recently, in International Star Registry of Illinois v. Bow-
man-Haight Ventures, Inc., an Illinois federal court held that it had
personal jurisdiction over a defendant whose web site contained
information that constituted trademark infringement and violations
of the Lanham Act, a federal statute, against the plaintiff in Illi-
nois.7 The court held that under the Illinois Constitution, a court
must consider whether it is "fair, just, and reasonable" to require a
nonresident defendant to defend an action in Illinois in light of the
"quality and nature of the defendant's acts which occur in Illinois...
or which affect interests in Illinois."71 Noting that the Seventh
Circuit Court of Appeals had yet to address the novel issue of what
type of Internet activity is sufficient to establish personal jurisdic-
tion in a particular forum, the district court reasoned that the Sev-
enth Circuit Court of Appeals had given consideration to where the
injury was felt and had found personal jurisdiction in cases where a
plaintiff's intellectual property rights had been harmed by out of
state acts. 72 The court also ruled that it is the quality of the contacts
with Illinois, not the number, that is determinative for the "pur-
poseful availment" analysis.73 Furthermore, it held that a single act
may be sufficient to find personal jurisdiction under the Illinois
long-arm statute.74
If the acts committed by Dieter do not constitute tortious acts
"committed within the state" for the purposes of section 2-209(a)(2),
Dave may claim that Dieter is subject to the personal jurisdiction of
Illinois by way of meeting the Due Process requirements of section
2-209(c). 75 Whether or not one is successful in claiming jurisdiction
under any of the exceptions in section 2-209(a) or (b), the court
must still consider the constitutionality of the claim via the Due
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Process Clause of the United States Constitution.7'
Under the Due Process Clause, a nonresident defendant may
not be sued in a forum unless he has established sufficient "mini-
mum contacts with [the forum] such that the maintenance of the
suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice." 77 Further, the nonresident's "conduct and connection with
the forum [must be] such that he should reasonably anticipate
being haled into court there."78 Although courts have developed
several tests to determine if sufficient minimum contacts exist, all of
them generally hold that minimum contacts are present if the
nonresident "purposefully availed" himself of the benefits of doing
business in the forum state.79
Furthermore, an "effects test" has emerged in cases involv-
ing intentional torts such as defamation, fraud, tortious interference
with contract, libel and conversion situations.8" Under the "effects
test," jurisdiction may be exercised over a defendant based on the
effect his conduct had within the forum.8' Under this test, a defen-
dant may be subject to the personal jurisdiction of a forum if he
commits an act outside the forum that is intended to have an effect
within it.82 However, the defendant must "purposefully" engage in
the conduct that creates the effects because mere foreseeability of
such effects is not enough to establish minimum contacts.83
In Klump v. Duffus, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals held
that a defendant's intentional act which occurred outside of Illinois
caused harm to the plaintiff in Illinois and therefore, under section
2-209(c) the defendant was under the personal jurisdiction of the
court.' The defendant argued that his negligent failure to act
occurred in North Carolina and that he had committed no tort
within Illinois.5 The court ruled that constitutional standards allow
jurisdiction over a defendant who acts outside a state's boundaries,
but causes harm to an individual within the state, provided that the
assertion of jurisdiction comports with "traditional notions of fair
play and substantial justice." 86 Ruling that the defendant had
purposefully availed himself of the laws of Illinois and had "fair
warning" that he would be required to defend in Illinois, the court
found there was no evidence that exercising Illinois jurisdiction
would be unreasonably burdensome.
From the cases decided in Illinois interpreting section 2-209,
it appears that Dieter's intentional act of electronically entering a
computer located in Illinois to further a scheme of fraud will sub-
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ject him to the federal court's jurisdiction. The effects test would
apply to Dieter because his illegal conduct has had the effect of
destroying Dave's credit rating, potentially subjecting him to nu-
merous civil and criminal repercussions. Further, there is little
doubt that Dieter purposefully engaged in the identity theft that
created the effects felt by Dave in Illinois. Dieter did not acciden-
tally or unforeseeably break into Dave's computer, steal his per-
sonal information and subsequently buy several thousands of
dollars of goods.
In most cases, conduct that satisfies a long-arm statute will
also satisfy the minimum contacts requirement.8 ' However, juris-
dictional analysis is highly fact-specific, with each case having the
potential to reach the Supreme Court of the United States.89 The
specific facts of the Dave hypothetical, or any situation in which the
Internet has been used to establish contacts with a forum, are par-
ticularly troublesome for the courts. Therefore, an analysis of recent
federal court decisions will help reveal the criteria the courts look at
in determining whether personal jurisdiction exists over a defen-
dant whose contacts with the forum state were established prima-
rily through an Internet connection. As the cases suggest, the "ef-
fects test" is emerging as an important criteria by which to deter-
mine the availability of personal jurisdiction in a given forum. This
analysis is contained in Section B, infra.
2. Personal jurisdiction conferred via specific federal statute
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(k)(1)(D) provides that
serving a summons on a defendant is effective to establish personal
jurisdiction "when authorized by a statute of the United States. 9 °
There are several federal statutes containing provisions that explic-
itly authorize personal jurisdiction and service of process. Similarly,
some federal statutes authorize personal jurisdiction based on
national contacts. 91 Examples include the Foreign Sovereign Immu-
nities Act of 1976, the Clayton Act, the Securities Act of 1933, the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and RICO.92 To establish personal
jurisdiction, some of these statutes explicitly allow "world-wide"
service of process from any United States district court to any place
the defendant may be found or where the defendant transacts
business.93 Other statutes allow for service upon the defendant
anywhere in the nation.
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In both of these situations, the issue of "minimum contacts"
is "whether the party has sufficient contacts with the United States,
not with any particular State."'94 Some courts have construed
"world-wide" service provisions as legislatively allowing service of
process abroad and the use of "national contacts" tests for the
purpose of establishing personal jurisdiction over a foreign defen-
dant.95 Additionally, lower courts have almost uniformly rejected
Due Process challenges in these circumstances.96
A cursory review of this particular jurisdictional grant under
Rule 4(k) is all that is necessary here since 18 U.S.C. § 1030 does not
contain a specific provision authorizing service or personal jurisdic-
tion over foreign or domestic defendants. Nonetheless, it is impor-
tant to note that Rule 4(k)(1)(D) does exist and may be available if a
plaintiff chooses to sue under a federal statute other than section
1030. Using Rule 4(k)(1)(d), plaintiffs may sue in a forum entirely
unrelated to the cause of action for any number of reasons.
Turning to the hypothetical, Dieter could easily conduct
activities within the United States that have a substantial effect on
Dave, yet never have had any effect on him in the forum in which
he chooses to sue. For example, Dave may have recently moved or
he may choose a specific district because he believes the law of that
district is particularly favorable and well developed. Rule
4(k)(1)(D) allows Dave this freedom provided he sues under a
qualified federal statute. Dave may want to find a statute that
contains a specific jurisdictional provision under which to sue
because section 1030 does not contain one. Computer related crime
has taken on many faces that can be prosecuted or litigated under a
number of statutes, like RICO for example, which contain a specific
provision granting personal jurisdiction over a foreign defendant.
In fact, computer related crimes can be charged under at least forty
different statutes.97
3. Obtaining personal jurisdiction under Rule 4(k)(2)
Rule 4(k)(2) states "[I1f the exercise of jurisdiction is consis-
tent with the Constitution and laws of the United States, serving a
summons or filing a waiver of service is also available, with respect
to claims arising under federal law, to establish personal jurisdic-
tion over the person of any defendant who is not subject to the
jurisdiction of the courts of general jurisdiction of any state."9 8 This
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rule was adopted in 1993 for the specific purpose of reaching inter-
national defendants who had sufficient contacts with the nation as
a whole to satisfy the Due Process requirements but did not have
sufficient contacts with any one particular state to be subject to a
long-arm statute.99 This section has significantly extended the
personal jurisdiction of federal courts.100
For example, in the Dave hypothetical, suppose the contacts
that Dieter has made with Illinois do not satisfy any provision of
section 2-209, including the "catch-all" subsection (c). 10 Prior to the
adoption of Rule 4(k)(2), neither the Illinois federal court nor the
state court would have had personal jurisdiction to hear the case.
However, because section 1030 creates a federal question, Rule
4(k)(2) allows the federal court to consider Dieter's contacts with
the entire United States in order to satisfy the requirements of Due
Process.02
Therefore, if the facts were such that Dieter has contracted
with numerous retailers in New York, Arizona, and California to
purchase goods and services, even if these contracts were unrelated
to his fraudulent conduct, this actually could create sufficient
contacts with the United States to satisfy the minimum contacts test
for Illinois. The court must comport with all of the normal "mini-
mum contacts" requirements of Due Process such as finding pur-
poseful availment, reasonableness, and fair warning.0 3 However,
under Rule 4(k)(2), these contacts may not be so prevalent as to
render Dieter subject to the personal jurisdiction of any of the
above mentioned states, for if they did, the cases would have to be
heard in that forum. Rather, the court considers the defendant's
contacts with all of the states in the union together to determine if
he should be subject to the personal jurisdiction of the United
States. If Dieter's contact with the nation in sum is determined by
the court to comport with Due Process, he can be subject to the
personal jurisdiction of any federal court in the United States.
However, it cannot be stressed strongly enough that this rationale
applies only where no single state forum would have jurisdiction
over the defendant.
Rule 4(k)(2) has raised some vexing issues regarding its
application to tag service, burden of proof, consent to jurisdiction,
and nationality and incorporation, to name a few °'4 These issues
are out of the scope of this article but a practitioner should address
all of them before deciding to base jurisdiction on Rule 4(k)(2). As a
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practical matter, while Rule 4(k)(2) is a powerful grant of jurisdic-
tion, it is a very narrow one that will apply only in rare situations
where international defendants are involved. However, in an in-
creasingly global economy where technology has made the Internet
a major commercial medium, the instances of a foreign defendant
having several contacts with the United States in general but none
so predominant as to satisfy the requirements of any one state long-
arm statute will undoubtedly increase. Further, a given court might
not believe a cyber-thieves' like Dieter's intermittent electronic
contacts with computers across the nation are sufficient enough to
create jurisdiction in a given forum. However, 4(k)(2) allows the
federal courts to consider the totality of the contacts across the fifty
states in determining whether the requirements of Due Process
have been met.
B. Recent Internet Jurisdiction Cases
The Internet is a multi-jurisdictional medium for obtaining
information that crosses territorial boundaries and allows people to
access information in one place which may not be located in any
particular geographical area but is available to anyone anywhere in
the world. l 5 The proliferation of the Internet into commerce and
every day life has proposed new challenges to the traditional meth-
ods by which the courts have determined personal jurisdiction.
However, advances in technology have not in the past, nor will
they likely in the future, signal the extinction of the Due Process
limits on the exercise of personal jurisdiction. 1"6
A few recent law review articles have comprehensively
discussed the cases decided regarding personal jurisdiction and
Internet contacts.0 7 These cases indicate that the current law is
unsettled and in flux.0 8 One thing is clear, until the world develops
a more appropriate method by which to decide issues of jurisdic-
tion as they apply to the Internet, the courts will continue to use
traditional long-arm and constitutional minimum contacts analysis,
even when dealing with foreign defendants. °9 The majority of this
section is a synopsis of the cases discussed in these articles that may
be analogized to the Dave hypothetical.
In a very recent case, Euromarket Designs, Inc. v. Crate &
Barrel, Ltd., a federal court sitting in Illinois found specific personal
jurisdiction over an Irish Internet retailer in a Lanham Act suit
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alleging infringement of the trademark "Crate & Barrel."" In this
case, the plaintiff was an Illinois corporation with its principle place
of business in Illinois."' The defendant was an Irish corporation
with its principle place of business located in Dublin. 2 The defen-
dant used the plaintiff's well known trade name "Crate & Barrel"
to establish its own store and Internet site selling home furnish-
ings. 3 The defendant's Internet site was interactive and available
to residents within Illinois."'
In taking the allegations in the complaint as true, the court
ruled that the defendant's alleged tortious activities established
personal jurisdiction over the defendant under the "effects doc-
trine." 1 5 Specifically, the court found three reasons why the
defendant's actions subjected it to the jurisdiction of the court: (1) if
the Crate & Barrel trademark had been infringed, the injury will be
felt mainly in Illinois; (2) the defendant intentionally and purpose-
fully directed its actions towards Illinois and Crate & Barrel, an
Illinois corporation, allegedly causing harm in Illinois; and (3) the
defendant knew that the harm would likely be suffered in Illi-
nois.'16 Further, the court held that if the tort of trademark infringe-
ment was found at trial, the primary injury would have been felt in
Illinois and that the defendant would have known that the injury
would likely be felt in Illinois.' 7 Therefore, the court ruled that
personal jurisdiction was proper under the effects doctrine."8
In Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Asiafocus International, Inc., a
Virginia district court upheld jurisdiction in a trademark infringe-
ment and unfair competition case against foreign corporations and
individuals residing in Hong Kong.19 Applying the Virginia long-
arm statute, the court held that the exercise of personal jurisdiction
was proper when the defendant causes tortious injury in Virginia,
or the defendant regularly did business, or engaged in any other
persistent course of conduct in Virginia. The court claimed specific
jurisdiction because it determined that each act of a Virginia resi-
dent accessing the defendant's Internet site by a Virginia computer
completed a tortious injury in Virginia. This decision is consistent
with the established notion that a court in the United States can
exercise personal specific jurisdiction over a defendant from a
foreign country if that defendant has committed an act having a
substantial, direct, and foreseeable effect within the United
States.2 0
Other decisions in which the defendants were diverse but
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still United States citizens are just as important to consult, since as
mentioned before, the courts will analyze an international defen-
dant in the same way.12 1 In California Software, Inc. v. Reliability
Research, Inc., a California company sued the defendant for making
communications that constituted tortious interference with the
plaintiff's business. 122 The communications took place via mail and
computer bulletin board.123 While the court held that the
defendant's computer contacts were not enough to create general
jurisdiction, the court did find that the defendant had subjected
itself to the specific jurisdiction of California 24 The court found
that the defendant could foresee that they would be summoned
into the California court because the defendant had aimed its elec-
tronic contacts at the forum state, the communications were in-
tended to harm the plaintiff, and the defendant's actions had
caused an injury in the forum state.125 The court further found that
the defendant's intentional tortious statements constituted suffi-
cient forum-related activity to subject the defendant to the jurisdic-
tion of the court.126
The court's reasoning in California Software, Inc. was similar to
the U.S. Supreme Court's reasoning in Calder v. Jones, a non-Internet
case, where the Court expanded personal jurisdiction to include
tortious acts directed at a state from outside its borders. 27 In Calder,
the plaintiff was an entertainer who worked and resided in Califor-
nia.128 The defendants, residents of Florida, were journalists for the
National Enquirer, a Florida corporation. 129 The plaintiff alleged that
the defendants authored a libelous article about her that was heavily
circulated within California.' 3° The defendants challenged the juris-
diction of the court claiming that they did not have sufficient con-
tacts with California to be haled into court there.'3' The appellate
court agreed that neither petitioner had sufficient contacts with
California to fall within the general jurisdiction of the state. 32 How-
ever, the appellate court concluded that the valid basis for jurisdic-
tion existed on the theory that the defendants intended to, and did,
cause tortious injury to the plaintiff in California. 33
The Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court's decision
holding that because California was the focal point of the story and
the harm suffered, jurisdiction over the defendants was proper
based on the "effects" of their conduct in California." The Court
reasoned that the defendants were not accused of mere untargeted
negligence. 35 Rather, the Court held that the defendant's tortious
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acts were intentional and expressly aimed at California. 136 Further,
the Court held that the defendants committed a tort they knew
would have a potentially devastating impact on the plaintiff and
that they knew the brunt of that injury would be felt in the state in
which the plaintiff lived.'37 Therefore, under the circumstances, the
defendants should have reasonably anticipated being haled into
court in California to answer for their tort.138 The Court concluded
that an individual injured in California need not go to Florida to
seek redress from persons who, though remaining in Florida,
knowingly caused the injury in California. 39
More recently in Panavision International, L.P. v. Toeppen, an
Illinois defendant who had no substantial, systematic, or continuous
contacts with California was nonetheless subjected to the personal
jurisdiction of the state via its long-arm statute that allowed exten-
sion of jurisdiction up to the limits of the Constitution.140 The court
likened the defendant's acts of "cyber-squatting" to extortion and
stated that it amounted to a "scam directed at California."'141 The
court noted that it was not holding that the defendant was doing
business in California, but that he was acting in a manner that was
"intended to, and did, result in harmful effects in California."142
This decision, along with European Designs, Calder and California
Software, Inc., contains an important and prominent thread in the
case law regarding the Internet and personal jurisdiction. 43
Moreover, in EDIAS Software International, L.L.C. v. BASIS
International Ltd., the plaintiff sued the defendant for breach of
contract, libel, defamation, tortious interference with contract, and
trademark infringement after the defendant sent e-mail messages to
the plaintiff's employees and customers expressing the defendant's
dissatisfaction with the plaintiff.'" The defendant was a New
Mexico company and the plaintiff had offices in Arizona, Germany,
and the Netherlands. 1 45 The court ruled that the defendant was
subject to the personal jurisdiction of Arizona as a result of its
contract and subsequent dealings with the plaintiff.'" In addition,
under a specific jurisdiction analysis the court directly addressed
the e-mail messages and determined that they constituted mini-
mum contacts because they contained defamatory statements that
were intentionally directed at Arizona and caused foreseeable harm
in Arizona. 47
Finally, in Maritz, Inc. v. CyberGold, Inc., a federal court in
Missouri found the presence of the defendant's Web site in Mis-
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souri was enough to satisfy the "commission of a tortious act"
provision of the Missouri long-arm statue."'8 In its reasoning, the
court held that the defendant's web site content combined with its
availability to Missourians was a violation of the Lanham Act,
which is tortious in nature, and that the exercise of personal juris-
diction was appropriate due to the three way nexus between the
web site, the alleged tort, and the forum.149 The court stated that the
defendant's activities produced an effect in Missouri because they
allegedly caused the plaintiff economic injury.5 °
It is relatively clear from the decisions discussed above that
the courts seem very willing to exercise their personal jurisdiction
in situations where the court believes that the defendant has acted
tortiously in an intentional manner within the forum state. It is also
apparent that the courts are willing to blur the territorial line when
it comes to intentional torts by allowing jurisdiction where the tort
may not have actually occurred in the state but where the effect of it
was intended to be felt in the forum state. The similarities between
the facts of the above cases and those the Dave hypothetical suggest
the court will use the "effects test" to determine if personal jurisdic-
tion should be exercised over Dieter. Given that fraud is an inten-
tional tort, and that the act of entering an Illinois resident's com-
puter electronically to steal information in order to commit a fraud
is an act more pervasive and intrusive than any of those regarding
Internet sites discussed above, one could reasonably expect a court
to construe a long-arm statute which allows jurisdiction where a
tort is committed within Illinois in the plaintiff's favor.
However, even if the court does not find that the tort in
Dave's case occurred in Illinois, and thus finds section 2-209(a)(2)
inapplicable, it could still find that the effect of the torts committed
in Germany were intended to be felt within Illinois. When a person
commits fraud they do so with intent and they do so knowing that
the effect of it will be felt in the place where the victim resides. 5' In
the case of fraud or theft, there is no question that Dieter intended
the plaintiff to feel the effects of the tort. Under constitutional
analysis, and section 2-209(c) of Illinois' long-arm statute, this
intended and undoubtedly foreseeable effect is enough to allow a
federal court in Illinois to exercise personal jurisdiction over Dieter.
However, it is important to note that in some cases the courts have
found that the defendant's actions, while tortious, occurred entirely
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outside of the state and were not intended to have effect in the
forum state."5 2
C. International Law and Personal Jurisdiction: Restatement
(Third) Foreign Relations Law
Section 421 of the Restatement (Third) outlines principles of
international law relating to the assertion of personal jurisdiction in
cases having international implications.153 However, international
law, as the Restatement provides, does not address the exercise of
jurisdiction between national and local courts in a federal system
like the United States, nor does it address the issue of subject matter
jurisdiction. The Restatement is a culmination of years of customary
international law designed to provide guidelines for the exercise of
jurisdiction across national boarders 54 The Restatement is not the
law in the United States. The courts in the United States are not
required to follow its guidelines, nor consult it in cases involving
international defendants being sued within the United States. 55 In
cases of private civil litigation, if a federal court finds personal
jurisdiction exists under Rule 4(k), it will exercise it barring some
special circumstances involving foreign state sovereignty.1 6 How-
ever, even though the courts are not required to decide cases ac-
cording to what the Restatement provides, they often do consult it
when it suits them.
As mentioned above, in private civil lawsuits, international
law regarding personal jurisdiction has been reduced to an after-
thought in most situations. In contrast, international criminal pros-
ecutions remain a very delicate situation for courts around the
world.57 When identity theft is committed through use of the
Internet, and a subsequent violation of section 1030 is prosecuted,
many international law issues such as investigation and extradition
must be addressed by the Secret Service before the criminal can be
brought to justice in the United States.1 58 The international jurisdic-
tional law pertaining to a civil action initiated under section 1030,
however, is clearly provided for in the Restatement.'s9
Section 421(1) explains: "[a] state may exercise jurisdiction
through its courts to adjudicate with respect to a person or thing if
the relationship of the state to the person or thing is such as to
make the exercise reasonable."" 6° Section 421(2) continues: "[in
general, a state's exercise of jurisdiction to adjudicate with respect
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to a person or thing is reasonable if, at the time jurisdiction is as-
serted.. .(i) the person, whether natural or juridical, had carried on
activity in the state, but only in respect of such activity;.. .(j) the
person, whether natural or juridical, had carried on outside the
state an activity having substantial, direct, and foreseeable effect
within the state, but only in respect of such activity... ."I" Jurisdic-
tion under section 421(2)(i), and (j) is considered specific jurisdic-
tion, allowing the courts of the forum state to adjudicate only with
respect to claims arising out of a contact with the forum. 62
From the language above it is apparent that section 421's
requirements for the assertions of jurisdiction by a state over a
foreign national are substantially similar to those the United States
courts would use in conducting a Due Process analysis. 63 Subsec-
tions (i) and (j) are virtually identical to many long-arm statutes of
the states of this country, including Illinois. Subsections (i) and (j)
also appear to represent the increasing acceptability of the "effects
test" as it is applied by United States courts. Considering the simi-
larity between section 421's and domestic state long-arm statutes,
combined with section 421 overall reasonableness requirement, a
foreign defendant who has committed an intentional tort against a
United States citizen, the effects of which were felt in Illinois,
should be subject to the personal jurisdiction of Illinois.6I In this
situation, an assertion of personal jurisdiction by a United States
court will not offend customary international law. Indeed, some
decisions have suggested, and international law does not expressly
forbid, that the court should consider a foreign defendant's contacts
with the nation as a whole like Rule 4(k)(2) provides. 65
V. LEGISLATIVE JURISDIcTION: APPLYING 18 U.S.C. § 1030 To FOREIGN
DEFENDANTS
To this point this article has explained how a plaintiff can
assert subject matter and personal jurisdiction over a foreign defen-
dant under 18 U.S.C. § 1030(g) in a manner which will leave the
federal court with little choice but to exercise their power to decide
the case. If obtaining subject matter and personal jurisdiction are
considered the first two steps in maintaining a lawsuit in the
United States, having the proper jurisdiction to impose United
States substantive law may be considered the third step. There are
generally two basic constraints on the United States legislature to
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enact laws that apply to international persons and their conduct.
First, international law has traditionally been thought of as restrict-
ing assertions of legislative jurisdiction by sovereign states. Second,
the legislature must overcome the United States Constitution's
limits on Congress and the states regarding legislative jurisdiction.
During the nineteenth century, American courts believed
that international law created strict territorial limits on national
assertions of legislative jurisdiction.'66 However, this belief began to
erode at the beginning of the twentieth century as courts in the
United States and abroad began to assert legislative jurisdiction
over foreign defendants based on the "effects test" and other
bases.67 One classic work of a American commentator discussed
the effects test, stating, "the methods which modem invention has
furnished for the performance of criminal acts ...has made this
principle one of constantly growing importance and increasing
frequency of application."168
In essence, the "effects test" applies to legislative jurisdiction
in the same manner it applies to personal jurisdiction in that for-
eign states may exercise legislative jurisdiction over defendants
who have committed acts outside a state but the effects of which
are felt within it.169 For example, the "effects test" has been used to
justify the extraterritorial application of the Sherman Antitrust Act
and various other federal criminal laws. 70 In cases like this, courts
no longer hesitate to exercise legislative jurisdiction.
In the last century, the United States and other countries
have adopted expansive views of national legislative jurisdiction
under international law. The Restatement (First) Conflicts of Law § 65,
adopted in 1934, expressly provides for an "effects test," stating:
"[I]f consequences of an act done in one state occur in another state,
each state in which any event in the series of act and consequences
occurs may exercise legislative jurisdiction."' 7' The Restatement
(Second) Foreign Relations Law § 18 allows a state to prescribe a rule
of law attaching legal consequences to conduct that occurs outside
its territory and causes an effect within its territory if its effects are
recognized as elements of a crime or tort under the laws of states
with reasonably developed legal systems. 172 More recently, the
Restatement (Third) Foreign Relations Law § 402 allows a state to
exercise legislative jurisdiction with respect to "(1)(a) conduct that,
wholly or in substantial part, takes place within its territory;... (c)
conduct outside its territory that has or is intended to have substan-
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tial effect within its territory."'173 What at one time was considered
a very stringent international interdiction on assertions of legisla-
tive jurisdiction has now become a more flexible and tolerant
policy, under the pressures of a more interconnected world
economy.
As the above discussion suggests, international law has
become more receptive to United States assertions of legislative
jurisdiction. The question that remains is how willing are United
States courts to apply the substantive law of the nation to foreign
defendants in light of constitutional restraints? It has long been
believed that federal legislation may constitutionally be applied to
conduct outside the United States.174 Moreover, Congress may
enact legislation that violates international law principles, and if so,
United States courts must disregard the international law principles
and apply the domestic statute. 75 This is true despite the presump-
tion that Congress does not intend to violate international law, and
that the Supreme Court has stated that unless a contrary intent
appears, congressional legislation is meant to apply only within the
territorial jurisdiction of the United States. 176 Therefore, Congress
has the power to exercise its legislative jurisdiction over foreign
persons and their actions. Whether Congress wants to do so is
determined only by looking to the language of the specific statue
that is being applied, and the intent of the lawmakers in enacting it.
Finally, the Due Process clause may forbid the exercise of
legislative jurisdiction over certain foreign defendants if their
contacts are not sufficient with the United States or the court finds
that application of the statute would be "arbitrary or fundamen-
tally unfair."'177 In practice, this constitutional requirement is rarely
relied upon to refute a court's exercise of legislative jurisdiction and
there are no reported federal decisions that have held extraterrito-
rial application of substantive federal law unconstitutional for lack
of Due Process. 78
In United States v. Davis, the court held that a federal criminal
statute could be applied substantively to a foreign national because
the statute explicitly stated that it intended the statute to apply
extraterritorially and its application was not fundamentally un-
fair. 79 The court ruled that compliance with international law did
not determine whether the United States may prosecute the defen-
dant under the statute." Instead, it ruled that the only consider-
ations that need be taken into account were whether (1) Congress
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made clear its intent to give extraterritorial effect to the statute, and
(2) the application was consistent with Due Process.181 The court
ruled that when an attempted transaction is aimed at causing
criminal acts within the United States, there is a sufficient basis for
the United States to exercise its legislative jurisdiction. 82 The court
then took notice of the fact that the lower court found sufficient
facts to support the conclusion that the defendant intended to
smuggle drugs into the United States. 83
Proving that legislative jurisdiction exists in the Dave hypo-
thetical is particularly important because if section 1030 does not
apply extraterritorially then there will be no federal question sub-
ject matter jurisdiction over the case. Therefore, this issue must be
carefully addressed. Unlike the language of the statute in Davis, the
language of section 1030 is not as direct in asserting extraterritorial
legislative jurisdiction. There is no specific sentence within section
1030 that indicates that the statute "applies extraterritorially."
However, there is language within the language that suggests it is
meant to apply to foreign defendants.
For example, in section 1030(a) Congress protects "...infor-
mation that has been determined by the United States Government
pursuant to an Executive order or statute to require protection
against unauthorized disclosure for reasons of national defense or
foreign relations..." if there is reason to believe that "such informa-
tion so obtained could be used to the injury of the United States, or
to the advantage of any foreign nation. . ."1 Further, subsection
(a)(7) states that whoever acts "with intent to extort from any per-
son, firm, association, educational institution, financial institution,
[or] government entity.. .any money or thing of value..." commits
an offense. 5 Subsection (e)(9) defines the term "government en-
tity" used above as including "any state or political subdivision of
the United States, any foreign country, and any state, province,
municipality, or other political subdivision of a foreign country."'186
This language can reasonably be read as extending the scope
of the statute to include foreign individuals who have acted in a
foreign nation to extort money from a United States embassador,
law firm, or any foreign political subdivision. Since the amend-
ments in 1996 added computers used in "foreign commerce" as
computers protected by the statute, section 1030 appears to cover
virtually every act of computer related criminal activity that can be
committed domestically or extraterritorially. Legislative analysis
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indicates that the inclusion of computers used in "foreign com-
merce" confers jurisdiction over international computer crime
cases." 7 Unfortunately, subsection (g) is silent as to its extraterrito-
rial application. However, construing subsection (g) consistently
with the rest of the statute's language may allow it to be applied to
foreign defendants outside of the United States.
To date, there have been no reported cases discussing extra-
territorial enforcement of section 1030. However, there have not
been many cases reported that discuss section 1030 at all. Since the
original reason behind the enactment of this statute was to provide
protection to United States government computers that were used
for national defense, one can anticipate that a court would decide
that Congress intended this statute to have legislative jurisdiction
over foreign defendants. 88 Any other interpretation would appear
to conflict with the design of the statute. Moreover, domestic and
international legal principles support the extraterritorial applica-
tion of statutes designed to defeat criminal activity directed at a
country from outside its borders.189 There should be no Due Process
limitations on this exercise of legislative jurisdiction.
VI. CONCLUSION
This article demonstrates how a victim of identity theft and
computer fraud can obtain the necessary jurisdiction in United
States courts to successfully sue a foreign national defendant pursu-
ant to 18 U.S.C. § 1030(g). Article III of the Constitution and 28
U.S.C. § 1331 and 28 U.S.C. § 1332 allow federal courts to assert
subject matter jurisdiction over a foreign defendant by establishing
a federal question or by claiming alienage. Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 4(k) provides a plaintiff with several options by which
personal jurisdiction can be exercised over a defendant located
outside the forum, many of which will be successful under the facts
of typical identity theft and computer fraud cases. In addition,
recent decisions discussing Internet contacts with the forum state as
grounds for asserting personal jurisdiction can reasonably be read
to support such an assertion of jurisdiction over a defendant who
has intentionally committed a tortious or criminal act via the
Internet that has an effect in the forum. Finally, although United
States courts have yet to do so, the language of section 1030 sug-
gests that Congress has created legislative jurisdiction over extrater-
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ritorial defendants. 90
If carefully applied, section 1030(g) can become a powerful
tool for victims nationwide to recover their financial and legal
integrity. There are significant hurdles to overcome when suing an
foreign defendant, such as obtaining proper service of process,
collecting evidence, and enforcing judgement. However, obtaining
the required jurisdiction is certainly possible and much less difficult
than one might expect.
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